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PREEMPTION: BREATHING NEW LIFE
INTO AN OLD GIANT
Gary V Weeks *
Herein is not only a great vanity, but a great contempt of God's
good gifts, that the sweetness of man's breath, being a good gift of
God, should be willfully corrupted by this stinking smoke ... A
custom loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the
brain, dangerous to the lungs, and in the black, stinking fume
thereof nearest resembling the horrible stygian smoke of the pit
that is bottomless.**
I. THE CONTROVERSY
A. Introduction
In recent years, plaintiffs' attorneys have pursued corporate gi-
ants with unprecedented success.' Changes in the law of strict liabil-
ity, comparative negligence, state of the art, and other theories of
liability2 have provided this new breed of giant-killers with the cour-
age of a shepherd-boy with conviction and with an arsenal of arms
with which to slay the corporate goliath. However, unlike the case of
David and Goliath, I Samuel 17:31-54 (approximately 1000 B.C.),
these giant killers prefer not to stand alone before the corporate giant,
but rather, shoulder to shoulder.3
While sophisticated strategy coupled with the "sling-shot" of
strict liability has felled many a corporate giant, the tobacco industry
* Member of Arkansas Bar. Associate, Bassett Law Firm, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Legal Writing Assistant, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas. J.D., University of
Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas; M.A., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas; B.A.,
Arkansas State University.
** James I of England (1566-1625).
1. This success, of course, parallels the development of the modern products liability
law. While MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), gave birth
to the modern concept of products liability, it was not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that
the generalized theories of strict manufacturer liability were developed and popularized.
2. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 90, 92 (1986).
3. Edell explains: "No longer do we find sole practitioners trying these cases, but rather
larger firms with the financial, technical, and manpower resources necessary to go the distance.
Groups of law firms have joined together to litigate these cases collectively. The extent of this
cooperation and coordination of effort among plaintiffs' counsel has reached national propor-
tion." Id.
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has been relatively successful at avoiding the sting of the shepherd-
boy's stone.4 In the initial confrontations, this corporate giant simply
relied on its superior size and strength to overpower its opponents.'
But twenty years of observing its corporate kin fall one by one has
taught this puffing philistine that size and strength may no longer be
enough. And so, not surprisingly, the tobacco companies have
reemerged on the field of battle dressed in new and formidable protec-
tive armor. The most promising and powerful piece of this protective
garb has been thus far the impenetrable breast-plate of preemption.6
B. Issue and Inferences
This paper explores the merits of the tobacco companies' pre-
emption defense. More particularly, this paper considers whether the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("Labeling Act")
preempts claims against tobacco companies based on failure to warn
adequately of the health effects of cigarette smoking. The pervading
import of this issue upon present and future tobacco litigants is stated
in succinct and summary fashion by the court in Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc.7
The District Court, the defendants, and the plaintiffs agree that the
issue of the Act's preemptive force controls the disposition of virtu-
ally the entire case. If the Labeling Act is found to preempt state
4. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1423 (1980), reporting tobacco companies' perfect record of never having lost or
settled a product liability case (except for those based on the presence of foreign object in
product). On June 3, 1988, a federal district court jury found the Liggett Group partially
liable for the death of Rose Cipollone, and awarded Antonio Cipollone, husband, $400,000.00
in damages. The jury found that Liggett, prior to 1966, had failed to warn consumers of the
health risks of smoking. This was the first time a cigarette company had been successfully
sued for damages in a personal injury case. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp.
208 (D.N.J. 1988).
5. Edell, supra note 2, at 91-92. "[Ilt is clear that the many appeals and retrials placed
extraordinary financial burdens on plaintiffs' counsel, resulting in many voluntary dismissals.
The only decision that actually discusses the impact of the manner in which the cases had been
defended is the unpublished decision of Thayer v. Liggett & Meyers, No. 5314 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 19, 1970). In that case, the judge observed that 'the facts themselves mock the mandatory
jury instruction that individuals and corporate institutions are always equal before the court
• . . [T]he magnitude of the impact of the disparity in resources between . . . [the] parties
through a sophisticated and calculated exploitation of the situation by the defendant, ap-
proaches a denial of due process which would compel the granting of a new trial. The ques-
tion, unfortunately, is now moot because plaintiff cannot afford further proceedings.' "
6. On the issue of preemption the score presently stands: Tobacco Companies 4; Plain-
tiffs 0. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (lth Cir. 1987); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds, 623 F. Supp. 1189
(D.C. Tenn. 1985).
7. 825 F.2d at 620.
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law actions, either expressly or impliedly, the Palmers lose. If
Congress did not intend for the Act to be so preemptive, Liggett
loses the appeal 8
In short, preemption provides tobacco companies with a poten-
tial9 absolute defense to plaintiffs' claims based on failure to warn.10
Given that other theories of tort recoveries have not been successful,"'
preemption could sound the death knell to any hope of recovery by
plaintiffs for damages attributable to cigarette smoking. 12
II. THE CONSTITUTION
A. Supremacy Clause
A federal system, without qualification or explication, inherently
embodies principles of conflict and confusion. No doubt, it was the
recognition of the potential for conflict between state and federal gov-
ernment, and the resulting confusion such conflict would engender
upon a citizenry attempting to serve two masters,13 that caused the
constitutional framers to give birth to the supremacy clause.' 4 This
clause provides that:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.
8. Id. at 622.
9. Obviously, the tobacco companies have so far been able to actualize the potentiality of
preemption. However, the Supreme Court has yet to speak the last word on this issue.
10. In Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187, the Third Circuit stated:
[W]e hold that the Act preempts those state law damage actions relating to smoking
and health that challenge either the adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages or
the propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and promotion of
cigarettes. We further hold that where the success of a state law damage claim neces-
sarily depends on the assertion that a party bore the duty to provide a warning to
consumers in addition to the warning Congress has required on cigarette packages,
such claims are preempted as conflicting with the Act.
11. See Note, Preemption of Recovery in Cigarette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be Sued
for Failure to Warn Even Though They Have Complied with Federal Warning Requirements?
20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 867 (1987) (citing Garner, supra note 4, at 1425).
12. See Note, supra note 11, at 868 (estimating health care cost and lost productivity at
fifty billion dollars). See also Note, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to
Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 643 (1987).
13. Luke 16:13 ("No servant can serve two masters.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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B. Preemption
The doctrine of preemption has its roots in the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. ' 5 These roots can be traced to the venerable case
of Gibbons v. Ogden 16 where the Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is pro-
duced by the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme law.
The appropriate application of that part of the clause which con-
fers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the
State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, though
enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere
with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of
the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the
United States. In every case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is
supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it. 7
Borrowing from the language of Gibbons v. Ogden,'8 one can
state the doctrine of preemption as follows: In every case where state
law interferes with or is contrary to federal law, the federal law is
supreme, and the state law must yield to it.' 9 Application of this doc-
trine in any particular case requires the court to determine first
whether the state law interferes with or is contrary to federal law.20
One commentator described the problem as "largely one of statutory
construction ' 21 and, therefore, one that "cannot be reduced to general
formulas. '2 2 However, the United States Supreme Court has devel-
oped a number of principles applicable to the doctrine of preemption
and useful in ascertaining congressional intent to preempt state
authority.
1. Express Preemption
The first, and perhaps most obvious principle of preemption is
that Congress may preempt state law by including an express state-
ment of preemption in the statute.23 Every court to hear the tobacco
15. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982).
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
17. Id. at 210-11.
18. Id.
19. Id. (emphasis supplied).
20. I.e., whether a particular federal law preempts a particular state law. Id.
21. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 377 (1978).
22. Id.
23. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
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companies' express preemption defense has rejected it.24
2. Implied Preemption
If a court cannot find preemption in the express language of the
statute itself, a court may yet find congressional intent to preempt
state law. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. ,25 the court identified two
general ways in which implied preemption may be found. 26 First, a
court may give implied preemptive effect to a statute if it determines
that Congress intended to "occupy the field" in a particular area.27
The United States Supreme Court has explained this preemption prin-
ciple as follows:
Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be inferred
because "[t]he scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement
it," because "the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be as-
sumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,"
or because "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same
purpose." 28
Implied preemption may also be found in instances where state
law, although not totally displaced, actually conflicts with federal
law.2 9 A conflict exists when "compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility"3 or when state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."'" In these situations, state law is pre-
empted only to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law.3 2
Preemption, one must remember, is only a means to an end: the
peaceful co-existence of state and federal authority within the frame-
work of federalism. While the supremacy clause decidedly tips the
scales in favor of federal law, some recognized safeguards exist that
24. See note 6 for circuit court cases deciding that Labeling Act does not expressly pre-
empt state common law tort claims based on failure to warn.
25. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
26. Id. at 248.
27. Id.
28. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
29. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
30. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
31. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
32. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Stellwagen v.
Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918)).
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prevent the unnecessary encroachment on and usurpation of state
power. 33
The first safeguard is in the form of a presumption "that Con-
gress did not intend to displace state law."' 34 This presumption is par-
ticularly powerful if the state law involved is state common law, since
common law is often embedded in many generations of judicial devel-
opment3 5 and concerns areas "traditionally regarded as properly
within the scope of state superintendence. ' 36 State common law tort
actions fall within the parameters of this more powerful presump-
tion.3 7 When applying the principles of preemption, a court must be
mindful of the presumption against preemption.3"
Next, "[p]re-emption of state law by federal statute or regulation
is not favored 'in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or
that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.' ,,39 Where a con-
flict between state and federal law does exist, state law should be dis-
placed, but only to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law.'
III. THE CONGRESS
A. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
In 1964, the Surgeon General of the United States reported that
cigarette smoking posed a significant health threat to Americans that
warranted remedial action by Congress.4' Congress responded in
1965 by passing the Labeling Act.4 2 Three sections of the Labeling
Act are particularly relevant to the issue of preemption. Section 1333
of the Labeling Act prescribes the exact warning label that is required
to appear on each cigarette package. It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, or
package for sale or distribution within the United States any ciga-
rettes the package of which fails to bear the following statement:
33. One might designate these safeguards as "precursory principles of preemption."
34. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
35. Iconco v. Jensen Construction Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980).
36. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
37. Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
38. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
39. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981).
40. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Stellwagen v.
Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918)).
41. 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2351.
42. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette
Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health." Such statement shall be
located in a conspicuous place on every cigarette package and shall
appear in conspicuous and legible type, in contrast by typography,
layout, or color with other printed matter on the package.4 3
As amended in 1970," the Labeling Act expressly stated the pol-
icy reasons behind the prescribed warning. Section 1331 provides:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to
establish a comprehensive federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect
on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to
the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and
(B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relation-
ship between smoking and health.4 5
The Labeling Act also contains a preemption provision. Section 1334
provides:
(a) Additional statements
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the state-
ment required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any
cigarette package.
(b) State regulations
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or pro-
motion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in con-
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). The 1965 Act required that the following warning be
conspicuously placed on cigarette packages: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous
To Your Health." In 1969, the required warning was strengthened to read: "Warning: The
Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health."
Id. In 1984, this warning was replaced with four rotational warnings required on all cigarette
packages, advertisements, and billboards. These warnings state:
Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphy-
sema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
Surgeon General's Warning: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks
To Your Health.
Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result In Fetal
Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Rate.
Surgeon General's Warning: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
45. Id.
1988-89]
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formity with the provisions of this chapter.4 6
B. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act
Recently, Congress passed the Comprehensive Smokeless To-
bacco Health Education Act of 1986 ("Smokeless Act").47 The
Smokeless Act requires the manufacturers of smokeless tobacco prod-
ucts to place warning labels on the packages informing the public of
the health risks associated with the use of the product.4"
The Smokeless Act, like the Labeling Act, contains a preemption
clause which is designed to effect uniform labeling practices. Section
4406 of the Smokeless Act provides:
(a) Federal action
No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and
health, other than the statements required by section 4402 of this
title, shall be required by any Federal agency to appear on any
package or in any advertisement . . . of a smokeless tobacco
product.
(b) State and local action
No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and
health, other than the statements required by section 4402 of this
title, shall be required by any State or local statute or regulation to
be included on any package or in any advertisement . . .of a
smokeless tobacco product.49
In addition, section 4406(c) specifically provides that "[n]othing in
this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or
under State statutory law to any other person." 50
IV. THE CASES
Recently, federal courts have decided four significant cases5 that
address the preemption issue. Even though plaintiffs' attorneys have
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
47. Smokeless Tobacco Act, Pub. L. No. 99-252 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-08 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 4 02(a) (Supp. 1986) requiring the rotation of the following warnings
to be placed on all smokeless tobacco products:
Warning: This Product May Cause Mouth Cancer.
Warning: This Product May Cause Gum Disease And Tooth Loss.
Warning: This Product Is Not A Safe Alternative To Cigarettes.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 4406(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1986).
50. Id. at § 4406(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
51. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds, 623 F. Supp. 1189 (D.C. Tenn. 1985).
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armed themselves with more powerful offensive weapons and strate-
gies, 52 in three of these four cases the cigarette colossi's preemptive
protection has ultimately proved too formidable a defense.
A. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. " the plaintiff brought a state
common law product liability suit against three cigarette companies
premised on theories of strict liability, negligence, intentional tort,
and breach of warranty. 4 The plaintiff maintained, among other
things, that the defendants had failed to adequately warn consumers
of the potential health risks associated with cigarette smoking.5 The
cigarette companies responded to this challenge by arguing that state
law claims based on inadequate warnings were preempted by section
1334 of the Labeling Act.56 In scholarly fashion57 Federal District
Court Judge Sarokin disagreed with the defendants and held that sec-
tion 1334 of the Labeling Act did not preempt plaintiff's state com-
mon law right to pursue her claim based on failure to warn.58
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed Judge Sarokin59 and held that because state law claims
based on failure to warn would "actually conflict" with the goals and
purposes of the Labeling Act, they were impliedly preempted.6"
B. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
In Roydson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.6 a Tennessee district
court, in a less scholarly but more succinct fashion, held that the to-
bacco company's compliance with the provisions of the Labeling Act
precluded a state common law tort claim for failure to warn.6 2 This
court, like the Cipollone opinions, found that the Labeling Act did not
expressly preempt common law tort actions based on inadequacy of
52. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
53. 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987).
54. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1148.
57. See Note, supra note 11, at 886 n.124.
58. 593 F. Supp. at 1170-71.
59. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1043 (1987).
60. 789 F.2d at 187.
61. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1987).
62. Id. at 1191.
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warnings.6' However, the court reasoned that such actions, by expos-
ing tobacco manufacturers to potential tort damages, would be incon-
sistent with the policy and purpose of the statute as set forth in
section 1331 64 By permitting state common law tort suits based on a
failure to warn, the state, the court reasoned, could achieve indirectly
(i.e., the placing of more stringent warning labels on cigarette pack-
ages and advertising), what it could not achieve directly (i.e., legisla-
tion requiring more stringent warning labels).65 Because one of the
stated policies of the Labeling Act is to bring uniformity into the area
of cigarette warning labeling, any duty imposed by the court upon a
tobacco manufacturer beyond that congressionally mandated would
be incompatible with the intent of the legislature as expressed in sec-
tion 1331.66
C. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.
Shortly after the Third Circuit reversed Cipollone,6' a federal
court again considered the merits of the preemption defense. In
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,6 Federal District Judge Mazzone
agreed with both the district and appellate courts in Cipollone that the
Labeling Act did not expressly preempt state law tort claims.69 How-
ever, Judge Mazzone rejected the appellate court's position in Cipol-
lone that the Labeling Act impliedly preempted the failure to warn
action. Rather, like Judge Sarokin before him, Judge Mazzone con-
cluded that "Congress did not intend to preempt common law reme-
dies for injuries caused by inadequate warnings in cigarette labeling
and advertising.""v
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit considered Judge Mazzone's opinion "thoughtful" and "de-
tailed"7 but wrong. 2 Contrary to the district court's ruling, the
appellate court held that state common law actions based on the the-
ory of inadequate warnings would excessively disrupt the balance of
purpose between health protection and trade regulation set by Con-
gress under the Labeling Act, and consequently, the Labeling Act im-
63. Id. at 1190.
64. See supra text accompanying note 45.
65. 623 F. Supp. at 1191.
66. Id.
67. 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
68. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 1174.
70. Id. at 1179.
71. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625 (1st Cir. 1987).
72. Id. at 629.
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pliedly preempted these actions where the warning given complied
with the Act.73 So, Judge Mazzone's decision, like that of Judge
Sarokin, provided only an ephemeral victory to the plaintiffs on the
preemption issue.
D. Stephen v. American Brands, Inc.
In Stephen v. American Brands, Inc. ,7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
which denied plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's preemption
defense to a state law action for failure to warn.75 In Stephen the
court summarily dismissed the plaintiff's appeal by "adopt[ing] the
decision and reasoning of the Third Circuit in Cipollone v.
Liggett .... 76
V. THE CONFUSION
Resolving the issue of whether the Labeling Act preempts state
common law tort claims has required the courts to ascertain congres-
sional intent (in this case, to preempt or not to preempt) through an
evaluation and interpretation of the language of the congressional
mandate. So, the question before the courts in each of the four cases
was: Whether Congress intended to preempt state common law tort
claims based on failure to warn when it passed the Labeling Act. The
facts of each particular case are relevant only insofar as they generate
this issue. Using Cipollone as the paradigm case, a review of the rea-
soning of the district and appellate courts that produced inconsistent
conclusions will help demonstrate the source of the confusion and dis-
agreement on the issue of preemption.
A. Express Preemption
In Cipollone," the defendants maintained that the preemption
provision of the Labeling Act expressly preempted the state law
claims since (1) state tort law has a clear regulatory effect and Con-
gress recognized this by not including a "savings clause" in the Act,
and (2) state tort law constitutes a state imposed requirements orpro-
hibition, expressly forbidden by the Act.7 8 The district court rejected
73. Id. at 626.
74. 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 313.
76. Id.
77. 593 F. Supp. 1146.
78. Id. at 1154-55.
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both arguments.
As to the absence of a savings clause, the district court agreed
with the plaintiff that state law claims would not constitute a regula-
tion of cigarette labeling or advertising, and had Congress held a con-
trary belief, it could have easily included a provision in the Labeling
Act extinguishing state causes of action.7 9 Also, the district court de-
termined that state tort law was not encompassed within the terms
"requirement or prohibition" and, as such, were not expressly pre-
empted.8 o While the district court acknowledged that tort actions
may have some regulatory effect, the district court stated that "the
primary and unquestionable effect of a finding of tort liability is to
'shift the burden of losses 'to' those who are in a position to either
control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses
when they occur.' "81 The district court concluded by stating:
The question of express preemption and the legal issues raised
thereby ought not, under the preemption principles previously
enunciated ... be resolved so as to displace traditional state com-
mon law remedies unless Congress' expression of its desire to do so
is crystal clear. Congress' words reveal far less clarity; it did not
expressly preempt the common law claims asserted here.82
In agreeing with the district court on this point the appellate
court said:
Because we are constrained by the presumption against preemp-
tion, we cannot say that the language of section 1334 clearly en-
compasses state common law. We find support for this
determination in Congress' failure to include state common law
explicitly within section 1334, as it has in numerous other statutes.
Indeed in the absence of a preemption provision encompassing
state common law, the Supreme Court has relied generally on prin-
ciples of implied preemption in evaluating whether a statutory
scheme preempts state common law.83
B. Implied Preemption
The district court next considered whether congressional intent
to "occupy the field" or an "actual conflict" between the claim and
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1155-56.
81. Id. at 1155 (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161
A.2d 69, 81 (1960)).
82. Id. at 1156.
83. 789 F.2d at 185-86 (citations omitted).
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the Labeling Act impliedly preempted the plaintiff's state law claim.8 4
The defendants based their implied preemption arguments on three
aspects of the legislative history of the Labeling Act. The district
court summarized the defendants' contentions as follows:
First, they [defendants] state that Congress made it absolutely
clear that the Act was not meant as a prohibition of cigarette man-
ufacture, sale or use. Citing the legislative history, defendants
point to congressional concern with the moral and economic effects
of such a prohibition, as well as to evidence that cigarette smoking
actually enhances psychological and social well-being. Second, de-
fendants point to Congress' desire to enact a uniform national pol-
icy with respect to the relationship between smoking and health, in
part in order to protect the aforestated values. And third ... de-
fendants [contend] that Congress intended that only the statement
prescribed in § 1333 appear on cigarette packages; thus, they ar-
gue, no court may impose a greater duty to warn and, indeed, no
cigarette company may voluntarily utilize a different warning.
Plaintiff's response to the defendants' arguments was that the
legislative history of the Labeling Act simply "assume[d] the contin-
ued existence of common law tort actions against cigarette compa-
nies," and that "Congress could not have intended and did not intend,
to deprive prospective plaintiffs of the remedy at law here sought."'8 6
In support of their respective positions, both plaintiff and defendants
marshalled forth the Act's legislative history.
1. Occupation of the Field
The district court acknowledged that Congress "intended to oc-
cupy a field,"8 " but, after a careful review of the Act's language and
legislative history, decided that "the field it occupied does not encom-
pass the common law products liability claims here asserted. '8 The
Labeling Act, according to the district court, expressly restricted the
occupied field to "cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to
any relationship between smoking and health." 9 Since products lia-
bility involves issues beyond the scope of this occupied field, and Con-
gress manifested no intent to extend the field to exclude traditional
84. 593 F. Supp. at 1157.
85. Id. (for overview of legislative history of Labeling Act on which defendants relied see
1157-60).
86. Id. at 1160. (for overview of legislative history of Labeling Act on which plaintiff
relied see 1160-63).
87. Id. at 1164.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
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state law remedies, the district court concluded that implied preemp-
tion was improper. 90
In reviewing the district court's opinion the appellate court
agreed that the plaintiffs' state law claim was not preempted by Con-
gress' intention to "occupy the field." 91 The appellate court, on this
issue, wrote:
In determining the scope of this field, we observe that the Ci-
pollones' tort action concerns rights and remedies traditionally de-
fined solely by state law. We therefore must adopt a restrained
view in evaluating whether Congress intended to supercede [sic]
entirely private rights of action such as those at issue here. In light
of this constraint, we cannot say that the scheme created by the
Act is "so pervasive" or the federal interest involved "so domi-
nant" as to eradicate all of the Cipollones' claims. Nor are we per-
suaded that the object of the Act and the character of obligations
imposed by it reveal a purpose to exert exclusive control over every
aspect of the relationship between cigarettes and health. 92
2. Actual Conflict
The "conflict" between the district and appellate courts' deci-
sions in Cipollone is whether an "actual conflict" exists between state
tort law and the Labeling Act. According to the district court, an
actual conflict exists "either where compliance with state and federal
law is a 'physical impossibility' or where state law 'stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' "
Noting the two-fold purpose of the Labeling Act,9 4 the district
court first determined that compliance with both federal and state law
was not a "physical impossibility." In rejecting the defendants' argu-
ment that state common law may impose labeling requirements on
manufacturers inconsistent with the Act, the district court pointed
out (1) that common law liability does not impose requirements upon
any party, but rather gives the party a choice of continuing in its con-
duct and risking liability or altering its conduct to reduce such risk;
and (2) that the Act did not prohibit the manufacturer from placing
additional information in its warning, but only prohibited it from not
including the prescribed information. Compliance with both state
90. Id.
91. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186.
92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. 593 F. Supp. at 1166 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
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and federal law, the district court concluded, was not a "physical im-
possibility" for the cigarette manufacturers.95
Finally, the district court reasoned that the existence of state
common law claims did not stand as an obstacle to the execution of
Congress' intent in passing the Labeling Act. In drawing this conclu-
sion, the district court found these reasons persuasive:
(1) that state common law claims existed prior to the passage of
the Act and were assumed to have survived its implementation; 96
(2) that Congress' intention that the cigarette industry survive
and that consumer autonomy be respected is not undermined by
the imposition of liability upon cigarette companies;97 and
(3) that Congress' intention to provide uniform labeling practices
would not be undermined, since state law tort claims are permitted
in other areas where federal labeling is mandated. 98
Given that the district court could find no "actual conflict" between
the state law claims and the Labeling Act, it concluded that the Act
did not impliedly preempt such claims.
The appellate court disagreed with the district court and con-
cluded that the purposes of the Act, as stated in section 1331, repre-
sent a carefully drawn balance between providing the public with
adequate warnings of the health risks associated with cigarette smok-
ing and protecting the interests of the national economy. 99 State com-
mon law claims, like those asserted by the Cipollones, have the effect
of tipping the Act's balance of purposes and, consequently, actually
conflict with the Act. l" Therefore, the court held:
[1] that the Act preempts those state law damage actions relating
to smoking and health that challenge either the adequacy of
the warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's
actions with respect to the advertising and promotion of ciga-
rettes [and] ...
[2] that where the success of a state law damage claim necessarily
depends on the assertion that a party bore the duty to provide
a warning to consumers in addition to the warning Congress
has required on cigarette packages, such claims are pre-
empted as conflicting with the Act. 1 '
95. 593 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
96. Id. at 1168.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1169.
99. 789 F.2d at 187.
100. Id.
101. Id. (footnote omitted).
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In reaching this decision the appellate court disregarded the
Act's legislative history, finding "the language of the Act itself a suffi-
ciently clear expression of congressional intent without resort to the
Act's legislative history."10 2 Also conspicuously absent from the ap-
pellate court's analysis is any meaningful reference to two prior deci-
sions 103 that should have some precedential impact on the court's
decision.
The Cipollone saga illustrates the problems courts encounter in
attempting to capture the ever elusive intent of Congress and the con-
fusion surrounding the preemption issue as it relates to the Labeling
Act. The appellate court chose to simply avoid these problems, ig-
nore the confusion, and find in the language of the statute what others
could not-a clear intent by Congress to preempt state law claims.
Unless the language of the statute supports this decision, one can only
conclude that this court has reasoned by judicial fiat. By replacing a
well-reasoned district court decision with the dogmatic assertion that
one need not look beyond the language of the statute to discover con-
gressional intent, the appellate court has not eliminated but engen-
dered confusion.
VI. THE CLARIFICATION
In resolving the question of whether Congress intended to pre-
empt state law claims based on failure to warn when it passed, the
Labeling Act, a court should consider five factors: the state of the, law
prior to the Act; the language of the statute; the legislative history of
the statute; the principle of stare decisis; and the passage of related
legislation.
A. Prior Law
Prior to the passage and subsequent amendment of the Labeling
Act, a number of products liability claims based on state common law
had been brought against cigarette manufacturers. °4 Included
among these were claims on failure to warn. °5
102. Id. at 186.
103. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
104. See Edell, supra note 2, at 90 n.2; see also Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1161-62.
105. Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), aff'd on
rehearing, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d
95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
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B. Statutory Language
The language of the statute is silent as to the status of state law
claims after passage of the Labeling Act. °6 The Labeling Act con-
tains no clause that expressly preempts these claims, nor does it con-
tain a "savings clause" that preserves them.'07
C. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Labeling Act reveals that Congress
was aware of the existence of state law claims prior to the passage of
the Labeling Act. 08 Yet neither the final committee report nor the
statute expressly address the issue.'0 9 However, in Cipollone, both
plaintiff and defendant marshalled forth the Labeling Act's legislative
history in support of their respective positions.110
D. Stare Decisis
Two cases,"' relied on by the district court in Cipollone but not
addressed in the appellate court's decision, provide precedential sup-
port in favor of disallowing the defendants' preemption defense.
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.," 2 the defendant argued that
tort claims based on inadequate safety would have a regulatory effect
and, consequently, would conflict with Congress' purpose of regulat-
ing the field of nuclear safety. The Supreme Court disagreed. Recog-
nizing the tension between the compensatory and regulatory nature of
state tort law remedies, the Court decided that Congress assumed that
state tort law principles would survive passage of the Price-Anderson
Act unless expressly preempted and also decided that Congress in-
tended to stand by both concepts and tolerate whatever tension ex-
isted between them." 3 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justice Marshall stated that "[w]hatever compensation standard a
State imposes ... [the defendant] remains free to continue operating
under federal standards and to pay for the injury that results.""''
This result, the Court concluded, would neither frustrate nor conflict
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
108. 593 F. Supp. at 1162 (citing 111 CONG. REC. 16,543-16,544 (1965)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1159-63.
111. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
112. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
113. Id. at 256.
114. Id. at 264 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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with congressional purposes. 115
In Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 116 Ferebee sued Chevron, a
producer of the chemical paraquat, for failure to warn of the dangers
of this insecticide. The defendant claimed that its compliance with
federal labeling laws.. 7 insulated it from tort liability for failure to
warn. The federal statute provided, a "State shall not impose or con-
tinue in effect any requirements for labeling . . . in addition to or
different from those required under this subchapter.""' 8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that state
remedies were not inconsistent with the Act, since compliance with
both state and federal law was not impossible.1 9 The manufacturer,
according to the court, could continue to comply with federal law and
pay damages to injured plaintiffs or could seek more comprehensive
labeling requirements. 2°
Chevron, like Cipollone, involved a federal warning statute, the
absence of an express preemption provision, and a plaintiff claiming
inadequate warning. Given these similarities, the appellate court in
Cipollone should have considered the merits of the Chevron decision.
E. Related Legislation
On February 27, 1986, Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986.121 A comparison
of the Smokeless Act with the Labeling Act reveals substantial simi-
larities between the two Acts' patterns and purposes. However, sec-
tion 4406(c) of the Smokeless Act specifically states that "[n]othing in
this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or
under State statutory law to any other person."'' 22 The timing of the
passage of the Smokeless Act coupled with this "savings clause"
prompted one writer to conclude:
The inclusion of subsection (c) in the Smokeless Tobacco Act re-
flects Congress' view that tort recoveries, based upon an inade-
quate warning in smokeless tobacco cases, would not "conflict"
with the accomplishment of that act's purposes. If that is so, why
115. Id. at 256.
116. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
117. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1982).
118. Id. at § 136v(b).
119. 736 F.2d at 1541.
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (Supp. IV 1986). See also text accompanying notes 48-50.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
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should a contrary conclusion be reached regarding similar claims
in the cigarette litigation?
When Congress reexamined and reenacted the Cigarette La-
beling Act in October 1984, and in August 1985, without amend-
ing the preemption provision, the only judicial interpretation on
record regarding the impact of tort liability on the accomplishment
of the Act's purposes was Judge Sarokin's. This is extremely im-
portant, because "Congress is presumed to be aware of judicial in-
terpretation... when it reenacts a statute without change." This
presumption is further buttressed by the fact that when the Smoke-
less Tobacco Act was enacted, Judge Hull's decision in Roysdon v.
R.J. Reynolds, which came to an opposite conclusion on the pre-
emption issue, had been decided. Congress, faced with these con-
flicting interpretations, felt it necessary to clarify its intent and did
so by including subsection (c) in the Smokeless Tobacco Act.12 3
These considerations strongly suggest that the clarity the appel-
late court in Cipollone found in the language of the statute was noth-
ing more than a chimera masquerading as congressional intent.
Given that no court has privileged access to the collective mind of
Congress, any analysis of the preemption issue that fails to take into
account these relevant considerations will appear superficial and ulti-
mately prove unsatisfying. If the circuit courts are truly convinced
that Congress intended to deny plaintiffs the right to pursue cigarette
companies for injuries caused by their product, then they should pro-
vide reasons why this is so.
VII. THE CORRECTION
Correction of the preemption issue must come either from the
United States Supreme Court or Congress. At this point neither op-
tion seems very promising.
The plaintiff in Cipollone petitioned the Supreme Court for writ
of certiorari on four bases:
(1) that the decision affects the state's authority to provide tort
remedies;
(2) that the decision conflicts with other federal and state court
opinions;
(3) that the decision conflicts with the decision in Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp.; and
(4) that the resolution of the preemption question would promote
speedy and consistent determination of the preemption issue in
other product liability actions involving cigarettes and other
123. Edell, supra note 2, at 101-03 and n.82-84.
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products. 124
The Court denied the writ. 25 Since then, both the First and Eleventh
Circuits have handed down opinions on the preemption issue that are
in agreement with the Third Circuit's decision in Cipollone.' 26 Given
this present unanimity of agreement, it is not likely that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari to consider this issue. 127 A contrary deci-
sion by one of the remaining circuits would, however, almost surely
guarantee that the Supreme Court would hear the issue.
Of course, Congress could resolve the preemption issue by simply
declaring its intent in passing the Labeling Act. An amendment to
the Labeling Act either expressly preempting or preserving state law
claims would certainly clear the air on this issue.128 Absent a clear
statement of legislative intent, it remains the lot of the courts to de-
cide the preemption question.
1 29
VIII. THE CONCLUSION
Ostensibly, a determination by the Supreme Court or a declara-
tion by Congress that the Labeling Act does not preempt state com-
mon law tort claims based on inadequacy of warning does not mean
that plaintiffs will automatically win. Rather, it means that plaintiffs'
cases regarding cigarette manufacturers' failure to adequately warn
consumers of the health risks associated with cigarette smoking will
be heard. Whether those cases have merit is altogether a different
question. 130 This writer suggests that given the language of the Label-
ing Act, its legislative history, prior precedent, and other related legis-
lation, it would appear that Congress intended for plaintiffs injured by
tobacco products to have their day in court. Not only does this result
comport with what appears to be the intent of Congress, it also coin-
cides with our sense of right. Absent a showing of good reasons to the
124. See Note, supra note 11, at 911 n.288.
125. 108 S. Ct. 487 (1987).
126. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (1lth Cir. 1987).
127. Apparently, it was the hope that a conflict among the circuits would be the impetus to
the Supreme Court's granting a second petition for writ of certiorari. See Gidmark, A Tobacco
Activist Predicts Success By End of '87, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 9, Col. 4; see Note, supra
note 11, at 911 n.288.
128. See Note, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses To Cigarette
Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 643, 665 (1987).
129. Id. at 665 n.164.
130. For a discussion of the merits of plaintiffs' cases based on the theory of inadequacy of
"warning," see Edell, supra note 2, at 102.
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contrary, these injured plaintiffs deserve the opportunity to present
their best case against the tobacco companies.
Thus far, the appellate courts' decisions have only had the effect
of depriving plaintiffs with tobacco related injuries from pursuing
claims against cigarette companies based on failure to warn. It is pos-
sible, however, that these decisions might have a spillover effect into
other areas of products liability litigation. The recognition of this
danger prompted one legal scholar to write:
It is the broader ramifications of the Third Circuit's ruling
that are most ominous. That court's view of preemption has the
burning force of a prairie fire, and it is hard to see what structures
of state compensation would survive the ensuing conflagration.
Food, drugs, cosmetics and toxic substances are all governed in
some manner by Federal warning laws. If innocent people are in-
jured because of inadequate warnings, or because advertisements
downplay the product's dangers, are all of them barred by Federal
law from pursuing tort claims in state court? If so, the circuit
court's ruling is cause for a knowing snicker in corporate board
rooms across the country.
It is true that such litigation is highly controversial. Like the
cigarette cases, the food and drug cases have been criticized by
some as excessive and wasteful. But in our Federal system, reform
of litigious excesses should ordinarily come from the states. If
state legislatures and courts decide to act to limit or constrain re-
covery, that is their prerogative. For a Federal appellate court to
draw a cloak of immunity over such cases is to overstep its place in
our Federal scheme.1 3 1
For now, at least the Cipollones, Palmers, Roysdons, and Stephenses
have taken their "last puff."' 3 2 It would appear that in doing so they
have breathed new life into an old giant.
131. Tribe, Federalism With Smoke and Mirrors, THE NATION 788, 790 (June 7, 1986).
132. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 629 (1st Cir. 1987), where the court
appropriately designates its holding as "The Last Puff."
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